












In Bogotá the 1991 reforms obstructed a market for votes. Clientelism lost its 
effectiveness; citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city showed an 
outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and social services.  This 
story is illustrated with a novel panel data at the neighborhood voting precinct level 
from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes the changing class preferences 
of Bogotá citizens for each of its mayors. However, the main result is the structural 
break caused by the reforms. Prior to 1991, the areas with the most exposure to 
clientelism generated a greater percentage of votes for traditional parties and 
obtained a greater coverage of social services; since 1991, both relationships are no 
longer true. A political machine collapses.  
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BOGOTÁ: EL COLAPSO DE UNA MAQUINARIA POLÍTICA 
 
Resumen 
En Bogotá las reformas de 1991 obstruyeron un mercado de compra y venta de 
votos. El clientelismo perdió efectividad, los ciudadanos desarrollaron un voto de 
opinión y la ciudad demostró un desempeño sobresaliente en la provisión de bienes 
y servicios públicos. Esta historia se ilustra mediante un novedoso panel con datos a 
nivel del barrio y del puesto de votación desde 1988 hasta 2003. Un  episodio 
interesante expone las preferencias de clase de  los bogotanos por cada uno de sus 
alcaldes. Sin embargo, el resultado principal  es el quiebre estructural ocasionado 
por las reformas. Antes de 1991, las zonas más expuestas al clientelismo generaban 
un mayor porcentaje de votos  por los partidos tradicionales y obtenían una mayor 
cobertura en servicios públicos; después de 1991, ambas relaciones dejan de ser 
ciertas. Una maquinaria clientelista colapsa.   
 
Palabras clave: instituciones políticas, cambio institucional, elecciones, clientelismo, 
compra y venta de votos, políticas públicas, Bogotá. 
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I.  Introduction   
 
“Although ideology played a part in the two traditional parties, the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, at election time the votes were mobilized by the local boss. He 
did this essentially by building a political machine that would reward him with votes at 
election time in return for favors rendered throughout the years. The boss’s network of 
political debts is created by helping people get jobs, sometimes in the private but 
mostly in the public sector, by getting scholarships for the children of members of his 
support group, and by having the state build infrastructure or extend public services to 
the municipality or urban neighborhood were the clientele is being built up.” (Urrutia, M. 
1991, PP. 387.Author’s emphasis). 
 
By the end of the last decade, several cities in the world, such as Mexico, Tanzania or New 
Delhi, turned their eyes towards the Eastern Andes. Unexpectedly, Bogotá was turning into a 
scene of great projects of infrastructure and unprecedented civic experiments. Something 
new was happening in the Colombian capital.  Twenty years ago it was difficult to foresee 
that a disorganized metropolis would be later transformed into the contemporaneous Bogotá. 
Maybe for this reason visitors who were exposed to both facets of the city seem surprised. A 
German reporter, for example, uses the following words to refer to the city of the 80’s:  
 
“My Bogotá was a city of permanent gray clouds, where the fetid smell of gases 
emitted by the thousands of buses and by the tons of garbage piled on the streets and 
the asphyxiating dust of the poverty stricken areas robbed you of air”. 
 
Two decades later his words are different:  
 
“Thanks to a series of human miracles, the Colombian capital has not only become 
one of the safest capitals in Latin America but also one of the region’s most important 
cultural centers and a kind and harmonic place to live” (El Tiempo, May 20, 2006. 
Author’s translation).  
 
Similar cases happen every day. However, the average citizen also felt the change. In 1985, 
for example, only 25% of Bogotá citizens believed the city to be a good place to live but 15 
years later, 67% thought the same way. (Torres, 2003). 
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Bogotá showed a break in history. One of the clearest manifestations was a notable progress 
in the provision of public goods and social services
1.  Graphs 1 through 4 illustrate part of this 
progress.  Graphs 1 and 2 show the percentage of expenditure in education and health, which 
surpasses that required by the Constitution. Both graphs show that between 1996 and 2001, 
Bogotá experiments an increase in these percentages and that the gap between Bogotá and 
the other Colombian cities increases as well.  Graph 3 shows the average rate of aqueduct, 
sewage, electricity and gas coverage for Bogotá and the other main cities. The average rate of 
coverage increases for both cases, although the percentage for the capital increases more 
rapidly. Finally, graph 4 shows the rate of homicides for Bogotá and for the rest of the country. 
Between 1991 and 2002 the homicide rate for the country falls in 12%, and the homicide rate 
for the capital falls in 46%.     
   
     
 
                                                 
1 This document makes a distinction between social services and public goods. In Colombia, the main social 
services are water, sewage, telephone and electricity, among others. The term ‘public good’ is used to make 
reference to a global public good at the Bogotá level, meaning, a non-rival and nonexclusive good (security or 
‘citizen culture’). The term ‘social service’ is used to make emphasis on club type goods, non-rival but exclusive.  
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How are the changes experienced in Bogotá explained? This document maintains that the 
improvement in the provision of public goods and social services has its origin in a political 
change consolidated by the constitution of 1991. The Bogotá where garbage was piled on 
the streets was also a city where political favors, money and jobs were exchanged.  
 
However, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 tried to break the clientelistic linkages between 
voters and candidates. In this sense, competition between parties was promoted, discretionary 
resources in the hands of politicians were limited and –maybe most importantly- a secret 
electoral ballot was introduced and distributed by an independent electoral entity and not by 
the parties (“El Tarjetón”).  Several authors (Gutiérrez (1995), García (2001), Hernández 
(2004)) consider that, at least in the capital, the reforms marked a turning point from a vote of 
exchange to a vote of opinion.  
 
The development of this vote of opinion is consistent with a complementary hypothesis: the 
weakening of clientelistic linkages and the appearance of programmatic linkages. On the other 
hand, clientelism has been associated to the discretionary provision of private and club goods 
in detriment of the provision of public goods (Chubb, 1981, 1982; Lizerri & Perisco, 2001; 
Wantchekon, 2003; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2006;  Kitschelt, H. & Wilkinson, 2006).  Therefore, if 
reforms really weakened clientelistic linkages, it would be possible to predict an increase in the 
provision of public goods and a separation between the supply of goods traditionally used for 
clientelism (social services) and electoral results. Did this happen in Bogotá?  
 
The present document intends to find an affirmative answer to this question. Basically, it 
intends to prove that the 1991 reforms consolidated a vote of opinion, limited the 
effectiveness of political machines and generated the necessary institutional framework to 
increase the provision of public goods and social services.  
 
The battle horse used to confirm these hypotheses is a balanced panel with the voting 
precincts existing in 1988 for the period 1988-2003. To build this panel the voting precincts 
existing in 1988 are placed on a map of Bogotá and the votes obtained by each candidate to 
the Mayor’s Office and to the Council are related to the socio-economic characteristics of the 
neighboring areas. These data, together with some econometric techniques (ordinary least-
squares, differences-in-differences, data panel and instrumental variables), are used to shed 
some light over the origin of the surprising changes that occurred in Bogotá.  
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The main result of this work is found upon measuring the degree of “clientelistic exposure” as 
the percentage of public employees around the voting precincts: Prior to the reforms, the 
traditional parties obtained a greater percentage of votes in the areas most exposed to 
clientelism and these areas obtained a greater coverage of social services. After the reforms, 
both relations break down.  
 
The document’s contribution is twofold. At a local level, it presents the political preferences of 
Bogotá’s social classes and defends the argument of the loss of effectiveness of clientelism 
in the local debate over the effect of reforms in the capital’s political practices. At a more 
general level, it allows the confirmation of some corollaries of clientelism (the relation of the 
latter with wealth, unemployment and education) and identifies institutional engineering 
factors that may reduce its prevalence.  
 
The document is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on clientelism and 
introduces the case for Bogotá. Section III develops the hypothesis and highlights the 
importance of the secret ballot (“El Tarjetón”). Section IV presents the data. Section V 
exposes the econometric models and results. Section VI concludes.   
 
  II. Literature Review: Clientelism, Machines and Reforms  
 
Welcome my son, welcome to the Machine (Pink Floyd). 
 
In Thailand, lottery tickets are sold where the payments are contingent to the outcome of the 
elections. If certain candidates are elected, a 5 baht ticket is converted into a price of 1000 
baht (Callahan & McCargo, 1996). In southern Italy, the Christian Democratic Party provides 
a left shoe prior to the elections and a right shoe only if the results obtained are favorable 
(Chubb, 1982). In Buenos Aires, the Peronista Party intermediaries or “gatekeepers” are the 
mandatory interfaces between a problem-solving network and the citizens; only gatekeepers 
know the day in which food will be distributed and only gatekeepers possess the credentials 
without which people will not have access to food (Auyero, 2000). In Bogotá, an intermediate 
patron of the Liberal Party,“[…] was known for keeping his promises: if he had promised to 
pave the street, he would only pave the portion in front of the house owned by he who had 
supported him” (Gutiérrez, 1998, PP. 75. Author’s translation). 
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These examples fit into what has been called clientelism. In all of them political support is 
given in exchange for direct transfers or continuous access to a flow of goods and services 
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2006). In order for political support to turn into votes at least two 
conditions must be met. Vote buyers must tie the voter’s expected utility to the patron’s 
electoral success (Robinson & Verdier, 2003; Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes, 2002) and they 
must be capable of monitoring the voter’s behavior at the ballot box (Robinson & Baland, 
2005; Schedler, 2004). 
 
In the first case, the voter’s behavior becomes predictable through incentive compatibility 
constraints:  a lottery ticket, a left shoe or a job in the public sector. In the second case, the 
voter’s behaviors are monitored in order to pay the promised favors and make the threats 
credible, in order to know which street to pave and which credential to deny.  
 
In both circumstances, incentive constraints and monitoring, there is a generation of 
credibility in both sides: the voter believes that the politician will keep his promises and the 
politician believes that the voter will keep his.  But this credibility can also depend on the 
iteration and expectations generated by past encounters (“in return for favors rendered 
throughout the years”, “he was known for keeping his promises”). When the exchange of 
votes relies exclusively in the latter unstable equilibriums are generated, any defection may 
bring down the market.  
 
The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that the goods exchanged through 
clientelistic linkages have specific properties. Some authors mention that the transfers must 
be selective (Lizerri & Perisco, 2001), excludable (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2006; Diaz-Cayeros, 
Estevez & Magaloni, 2006) and reversible (Robinson & Verdier, 2003). The candidate 
chooses who receives the transfer (selection), who does not receive it (exclusion) and who 
looses it (reversibility).  
 
By not being excludable or selective, public goods cannot be exchanged through clientelistic 
exchange.  For this reason, in those areas where clientelistic linkages prevail, private 
transfers or discretional transfers of club type goods (the street) are favored in detriment of 
the provision of public goods (Chubb, 1981, 1982; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2006; Wantchekon, 
2003).  
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Now, for the patron, the cost of creating clientelistic linkages falls on the construction of 
organizational exchange hierarchies (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2006). Patrons must go through 
intermediaries in order to obtain their clients’ votes (hereinafter referred to as Patron- 
Intermediate Patron-client, P-IP-C, connections) (see for example Papadopoulos and Vaner, 
1989 or Cacliagi and Jun Ichi, 2001).  The inconvenience of this pyramidal organization is 
that it suffers and reproduces agency problems as its size increases (excessive appropriation 
of resources and failure to keep promises). Consequently, parties must arrange a monitoring 
and incentive structure that allows them to overcome these problems, take advantage of 
preexistent social networks and obtain votes: the political machine.  
 
These machines have been analyzed in the literature through interviews and case studies. 
The figure that emerges is one in which the big patrons or parties look for trustworthy men at 
a local level (intermediate patrons) in order to obtain the votes of a determined geographic 
area. This strategy is not fortuitous.  A local intermediary has access to the social networks 
of his district, constitutes an effective channel for the distribution of favors
2 and may use prior 
trust relations in order to lay the foundations of his promises
3. In Taiwan, for example, 
intermediaries are known as “pillars” (tiau-a-ka). The Nationalist Kuomingtan Party recruits 
them according to their area of residence and according to the circles of trust of which they 
make part (Wang & Kurzman, 2003).  In Thailand, the “Huakhanaen” are charismatic people 
of elevated social status, the local schoolteacher or town leader (Calahan & McCargo, 1996).  
In the Japanese megalopolis, intermediaries are organized in local support groups (Koenkai) 
that provide all types of favors, from jobs to ‘The Godfather’ type donations (distribution of 
money packages at weddings and funerals) (Cacliagi & Jun Ichi, 2001). In southern Italy, the 
mediator is the church abbot or a middle class public employee who mobilizes votes from his 
neighbors and family members (Chubb, 1981). A similar thing happens in Argentina and 
Colombia. In these two countries, intermediaries are usually local leaders who obtain, from 
the state, a job in the public sector (Auyero, 2000; Archer, 1990; Leal 1989). The 
intermediate patrons’ objective is clear, raise blocks of votes for superior levels in the 
pyramid; give votes to the main patron.  
 
In Colombia, studies on clientelism share at least two of the following three characteristics: 
they define clientelism as an endemic phenomenon to Colombian politics, they identify 
                                                 
2 In Bogotá, given that intermediaries were neighborhood leaders who had socially ascended due to clientelism, 
the main payment for the client was an expectation of social ascent (Gutiérrez, 1998).  
3 In smaller groups trust is greater as the possibility to act in a non-cooperative way and pass unnoticed is less 
(Ridley, 1998).    9
traditional parties as the main users of the vote buying and selling machine and they 
consider that clientelism has changed in its form but continues to be an alternative for vote 
gathering (the two first characteristics are found in the works of Martz (1997), Archer (1990), 
Leal (1989), Robinson (2005), Urrutia (1991), Escobar (2002), Fernández (2005), Romero 
(2006); the three are found in Gutiérrez (1998), García (2001), Dávila and Delgado (2002), 
Hernández (2004)).   
 
Robinson (2005) points out that Colombia has been classified (by Carey and Shugart, 1995) 
as the nation with the most clientelistic institutions in Latin America and argues that this is 
due to the permanence in power of the traditional parties (restricted democracy). 
Conservatives and liberals have had the time and resources necessary to build elaborated 
organizational hierarchies for the monitoring and the distribution of favors.  Other authors 
(Gutiérrez, 1998; Dávila & Delgado, 2002; García, 2001) agree with the importance of vote 
buying  for traditional parties but make emphasis on the mutations of clientelism or on what is 
called by Dávila and Delgado as the two and a half stages of clientelism: traditional 
clientelism (up to mid-1950’s), modern clientelism (1955-1991) and market clientelism (as of 
1991).  
 
The first stage refers to the links between the natural leaders of the traditional parties, the 
landowners and their workers. This phase of clientelism may be described by means of the 
vote-buying model developed by Robinson and Baland (2005). In synthesis, the natural 
leaders formed coalitions with the local landowners who sold their workers’ votes in 
exchange for political benefits. 
 
The second stage of clientelism in Colombia corresponds to the pyramidal structure 
described above (the machine) and was in force since the National Front
4 (Martz, 1997; 
Archer, 1990). During this stage the political machine would have been fed by the 
broadening of the State and the emergence of politicians specialized in handling the State’s 
resources (Escobar, 2002). This type of clientelism was also in force in Bogotá, and maybe 
in other cities in the country, prior to the democratic reforms of 1991.   
 
The last stage (half stage) corresponds to what the local literature calls the market 
clientelism and its origin is associated with the reforms’ disarticulating effect. The market 
                                                 
4 The national front is a period (1958-1974) in which, by means of an agreement between conservatives and 
liberals, both parties alternated the presidency and equally shared the burocratic quotas.    10
clientelism would be characterized by multiple local networks in continuous competition, 
meager links between big patrons and local leaders (intermediaries) and intermittent links 
between the latter and the voters.  The great machine with P-IP-C type linkages would have 
broken into pieces and its parts would form a chaotic competitive fringe of small IP-C type 
electoral networks.  This is what Gutiérrez (1998) calls the “fractalization” of clientelism, the 
explosion of the machine in small local machines comparable to the first.  This is what this 
document calls, the Collapse of a Political Machine.  
 
It is precisely in Bogotá where market clientelism has been mostly talked about. This may be 
explained due to the existence of differences in the electoral preferences and tendencies in 
Bogotá with regards to the rest of the country (Otálora, 2002). These differences generate 
different replies to the reforms. At a national level, a recent work (Romero, 2006) tries to 
measure the effect of reforms over the clientelistic assignment of jobs in the education sector 
but does not find a significant change after 1991. Likewise, Escobar (2002) documents how, 
in the department of Sucre, clientelism frustrates institutional changes and not the other way 
around. The inertia of clientelism would attempt against the voters’ civic values: “People 
believe that selling their votes is a right they have” (interview with a peasant leader in 
Escobar, PP. 20).  However, in Bogotá things seem different: “In the first place we must point 
out that with the victory of independents it was possible to displace the influence of 
clientelistic networks over the district’s public decisions […]”(Hernández, PP.25 ,2004. 
Author’s translation).  
 
The Constitution of 1991 may explain the rise of market clientelism.  The Letter promoted the 
entry of all types of parties and created spaces for participation at a local level. Both factors 
should generate new ways of making politics and, from a voter’s point of view, options to 
withdraw from clientelism (García, 2001; Dávila and Delgado, 2002). To end clientelism more 
direct mechanisms were contemplated. Discretionary resources in hands of politicians were 
limited and raw monitoring techniques were attacked. On the one hand, “auxilios” were 
prohibited (‘pork barrel funds’) and public employment was universalized; on the other hand, 
an electoral ballot was introduced and distributed by the electoral organization and not by the 
parties (“El Tarjetón”).  
   11
With the Constitution and with the Estatuto Orgánico de Bogotá
5, the capital’s management 
became independent from the rest of the country and a firewall was placed between the 
executive branch and the legislative branch. Prior to 1991, there existed a co-administration 
regime between the Council and the Mayor’s Office. The former had inherence in the 
execution of projects and in the district’s budge,t and its members made part of the 
administrative boards of the district companies (amongst them, social services companies). 
But in 1991, the faculties of the Council were restricted and the power in the hands of the 
mayor was increased. In turn, the mayor acquired autonomy to prepare the Development 
Plan, to appoint his government staff and to create and implement urban and district policies 
(Hernández, 2004).  
 
The first popular election for mayor in Bogotá took place in 1988. From this date and up to 
1992 candidates belonging to the traditional parties occupied the Mayor’s Office. One of 
them, Juan Martín Caicedo (1990-1992), was subject to a criminal process for granting 
parliamentary aids when these had just been prohibited. However, three years after the 
reforms, these attest a blow against clientelism and unravel what has been called “the 
antipolitics revolution” (Gutiérrez, 1995).  In 1994, for the first time in the history of Bogotá, a 
candidate independent from traditional parties -Antanas Mockus- arrives at the Mayor’s 
Office. Since then, citizens seem to have developed a vote of opinion (Gutiérrez (1995), 
García (2001), Hernández (2004)) and have elected independent candidates
6 whose 
proposals originate in programmatic platforms.  
 
The vote of opinion and the arrival of the independent mayors coincide with an increase in 
the provision of public goods and with the universalization of the offer of social services. The 
district currently has a collection per inhabitant greater to that of any other city in the country, 
shows expenditures in education and health over the constitutional mandate and levels of 
security that increase through the years. In the early 90’s, companies in charge of providing 
social services were broke.  Today, the public services coverage is almost total. How are 
these changes explained?  
 
                                                 
5 Provisional article 41 of the Constitution of 91 established the Organic Statute of Bogotá, which materialized on 
July 21, 1993 (decree law 1421). It was in charge of the city’s administrative political division and deepened some 
aspects set forth in the constitution such as the prohibition of  “auxilios” (aids) granted to councilmen.  
6 In strict terms, Peñalosa, the mayor elected after Mockus, is liberal but he seeked to move away from the parties 
and present himself as an independent candidate closer to Mockus’s precepts (antipolitics and civil culture) than 
to traditional parties.     12
As was seen, certain authors argue that the reforms are the cause of the metamorphosis of 
modern clientelism into market clientelism. Hernández (2004) and Gutiérrez (1995) add that, 
in Bogotá, the reforms marked a turning point from the exchange vote to the vote of opinion. 
If, as is also argued by these authors, market clientelism translates into greater risks and 
uncertainties for patrons and into exit options for clients, then, although mutable, political 
machines should have lost their capacity to generate votes. This is consistent with the 
programmatic candidacies and with the increase in the provision of public goods and social 
services. However, there is still no empirical evidence to verify this story.  This document 
seeks to fill the void and highlight aspects in the history of Bogotá that are useful for the 
study of clientelism.  
 
In this respect, two comments in the exhaustive review of clientelism carried out by Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson (2006) call attention. The first highlights the lack of documents that explain in 
what context and how the different forms of clientelism appear and disappear. The second 
one is summarized in the following paragraph:  
 
“Empirical chapters of our study almost invariably find that institutions have little 
independent explanatory power to account for cross-sectional variance among 
linkage mechanisms or their change over time.” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2006, 
PP. 18).  
 
This document shows that a good place to analyze the change in the forms of 
clientelism may be Bogotá. It also shows that the experience of Bogotá constitutes 
an unpublished chapter on the effects of institutional reforms over the types of 





It has been seen that the 1991 reforms introduced changes to end clientelism. It has also 
been seen that the traditional parties are identified as the main users of the political machine. 
The 1994 election of Antanas Mockus, candidate without any connection to traditional 
parties, is a symptom that the clientelist machine ceased to work correctly. Additionally, from 
a theoretical perspective, clientelism is associated with an undersupply of public goods and 
with the supply of collective goods in a discretional manner; but it was precisely in the first   13
half of the 90’s that Bogotá began to demonstrate an outstanding performance in the 
provision of these goods.   
 
These elements, jointly taken, lead to the formulation of a series of hypotheses. The election 
of the first independent mayor of Bogotá and the increase in the provision of public goods 
and services are explained by the collapse of a political machine and by the transit from an 
exchange vote to a vote of opinion. After the 1991 reforms, vote buying lost effectiveness as 
a mechanism to reach the Mayor’s Office. With a machine that did not function properly, 
traditional parties lost control over their clientele and limited the use of State resources for 
discretionary transfers.  
 
Gutiérrez (1998), García (2001) and Hernández (2004) argue that in the early 90’s, there 
was a change from a system of pyramidal articulation which included mayors, councilmen, 
intermediaries and clients to a group of electoral networks organized around local leaders 
with a limited capability at the time of mobilizing resources. These networks or electoral 
micro-companies are in constant competition and do not possess ties to big patrons and to 
“big resources”. Thus, the electoral networks constitute less effective structures for 
clientelism. The rupture of the great pyramid and the rise of the electoral micro-companies, is 
what this document calls the Collapse of a Political Machine.  
 
In a schematic way, the hypothesis exposed may be represented as follows,  
 
  Reforms                  less clientelism                 Vote of Opinion and Independent Mayors  




The reforms decreased the vote buying as they unstabilized the links between intermediary 
patrons and clients (IP-C linkages) and broke the unions between great patrons and 
intermediate patrons (P-IP linkages).  The introduction of the secret ballot impeded the 
monitoring of voters and the entry of all types of parties increased competition and the cost of 
the votes (unstable IP-C ties). This difficulty to generate votes, the prohibition of “auxilios”, 
the universalization of public employment and the end of the co-administration of the district 
broke promises in the highest part of the pyramid, turning into the cannonball that would 
destroy it (fractured P-IP ties). 
More public goods. 
Less discretionary transfers.   14
In theory, less clientelism limits discretionary transfers and increases the resources available 
to offer public goods. But, at the same time, less clientelism propelled the transit from 
exchange votes to votes of opinion and the arrival of independent mayors who offered public 
goods instead of discretionary transfers. This option was favored by the Organic Statute of 
Bogotá, which increased the harmlessness of the Council in the preparation of the district 
budget.  
 
Three factors have been identified in the Constitution of 1991 that may explain the 
weakening of clientelism. These are competition amongst parties, the reduction of resources 
in the hands of politicians and the introduction of the secret ballot. As will be seen later the 
methodology used does not allow establishing which is the dominant effect. However, if a 
guilty party had to be chosen, it would be “El Tarjetón”.  
 
Understanding this is not trivial if the ballot prior to the reforms (a piece of paper distributed 
by the parties called “La Papeleta”) is considered as a simple monitoring mechanism. 
Indeed, the intermediate patrons gave their clients one of these ballots and verified the 
client’s behavior at the voting tables. In principle, after the 1991 reforms, the secret ballot 
would impede this type of monitoring.  This, however, is not completely true. The secrecy of 
the Ballot may be violated in multiple ways; one of the simplest ways being using carbon 
paper to keep a record of the voter’s behavior (for a recount of the methods used to violate 
the secrecy of an official ballot see Schaffer. & Schedler (2006)). 
 
But there exists an additional factor, in addition to the easy monitoring, which explains the 
relative advantage of clientelism in Colombia when using electoral “Papeletas” such as those 
used prior to the 1991 reforms. Given that the “Papeletas" were distributed by the parties, 
only parties that had access to the electoral machine in order to get them to the voters had 
real chances of winning. This is described in succinct terms by Pizarro (2002):  
 
“In the past, votes were designed, prepared and distributed by each of the 
parties or political fractions. This meant that only those who had access to the 
electoral machine which would allow them to access all voting tables in a city, a 
municipality or a department would have real options. The minority parties had, 
therefore, a huge logistical weakness: for example, a leftist party in Antioquia 
that only counted with militants and sympathizers to cover 20% of the electoral 
tables, would see its electoral possibilities seriously compromised beforehand   15
even if it had enormous political sympathies in its favor. Its sympathizers would 
simply be unable to go to the voting tables, as they would not have the 
corresponding voting ballot” (PP. 14-15. Author’s translation).  
 
But it has been seen that traditional parties were those that disposed of great machinery, 
machines that were at the same time specialized in the distribution of favors. The 
introduction of “El tarjeton” must have limited the relative advantage of these machines and 
hindered –at least temporarily- the monitoring of voters. In short, these circumstances would 




Given that this document builds a new database, this section describes in detail the 
construction of the database and its main variables. The latter are defined in table 1 below. 
Columns (3) and (4) indicate for what years the variables are available when the observation 
is over the Influence Area or the Locality. The Influence Area corresponds to circles with two 
or four kilometers in diameter around each of the voting precincts. The locality corresponds 
to the administrative division of the city into 20 areas of which 19 were used given that one of 
them, Sumapaz, is completely rural.  
 
The support for the methodology is a balanced panel with the voting precincts existing in 
1988 for each election of mayors and councilmen in Bogotá between 1988 and 2003 (the 
elections of mayors and councilmen are simultaneous). The steps for the construction of the 
panel data are as follows:   
 
1. The 1993 census divides the map of Bogotá into 621 areas called “censual sectors”. With 
the 1993 census the socio-economic variables at a censual sector level were calculated. 
These variables are: the percentage of people over 18 (25, 30) with primary education 
(secondary, university), the unemployment rate, the percentage of women, the percentage of 
public employees and the rates of coverage of sewage, aqueduct, electricity and telephone. 
The 1993 census was provided by the National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE). 
 
2. The stratum variable was obtained from Stratification, at the Administrative Department for 
District Planning.    16
3. The number of votes obtained for each candidate to the Mayor’s Office and to the Council 
at a voting precinct level was acquired at the National Civil Status Registry. The candidates 
were divided into two categories: traditional (conservative and liberal) and independent. Any 
party with the term “Conservative” or “Liberal” was catalogued as traditional and the rest of 




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Preferences for the party or candidate c. Percentage of votes 
in the  precinct* i, in the year t, for the candidate or party c.
1988, 1990, 1992, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003
1988, 1990, 1992, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003
Clientelistic potential. Measure of exposure to clientelism. 
Public Employees per one hundred inhabitants. 
1993 1993, 2003
Sum of sewage, aqueduct, electricity and telephone coverage.  1986, 1993 1986, 1993, 2003
Voting in Excess. Participation of  the votes coming from 
precinct i in the total of votes obtained by candidate or party 
c, over the historical potential of voting in unit i. 
1988, 1990, 1992, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003
1988, 1990, 1992, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 
2003
Stratum
Socioeconomic stratum of the population. Measure of wealth, 
which increases as the material conditions of housing and the 
quality of social services increase.
1993, 1997, 2003 1993, 1997, 2003
Primary Percentage of people over 18 with primary education. 1993 1993
Secondary Percentage of people over 25 with secondary education. 1993 1993
University Percentage of people over 30 with university education. 1993 1993
Unemployment Percentage of unemployed people. 1993 1993
Table 1: Main Variables









4. The voting precincts existing in 1988 were placed in the map of Bogotá. On the other 
hand, the information of the 1993 census and of stratification was assigned to each censual 
sector.  
   17
5. Circles with two or four kilometers in diameter were created around each voting precinct 
(influence areas). These influence areas were used to assign each voting precinct the 1993 
census variables and the stratification variables.  Each voting precinct was assigned the 
weighted average of the censual sectors that falls within its influence area.  The basic 
assumption behind this step is that people vote near their place of residence. The results 
shown use the influence areas of two kilometers.  
 
6.  The 1985 census and the 2003 quality of life survey were used to obtain other 
measurements in time of the coverage of public services. Another measurement of public 
employees for 2003 was also obtained. Unfortunately, these variables are only 
representative at a locality level.  
 
There were 336 voting precincts in 1988. Excluding the precincts located in Corferias
7 and 
the precincts located in the locality of Sumapaz, the number is reduced to 327 of which it was 
possible to locate 322. The period of study covers seven mayor elections: Andrés Pastrana 
in 1988, Juan Martín Caicedo in 1990, Jaime Castro in 1992, Antanas Mockus in 1994, 
Enrique Peñalosa in 1997, Antanas Mockus in 2000 and Luis Garzón in 2003. The 
conservative-liberal-liberal-independent-liberal-independent-independent sequence resumes 
the mayors’ parties
8.  Table A1 of the Appendix shows the main candidates to the Mayor’s 
Office, their parties and the percentage of votes obtained in each election from 1988 to 2003.  
 
It is important to note that the traditional candidates tend to hide their political platform after 
being defeated in 1994 (Gutiérrez, 2001).  Ever since, it is not easy to distinguish the party of 
those who register as independent in order to separate themselves from the loss of 
legitimacy of the traditional parties. This is particularly notorious for the year 2000 in which 
the traditional parties practically disappear from the Registry listings. To mitigate this problem 
the majority of results shown restrict the sample to the period 1988 -1994. 
 
V.  Results. 
 
A. The Preferences of Bogotá Citizens: A Vote of Opinion? 
 
                                                 
7The people that do not register in time in any of the voting precincts at a ‘neighborhood’ level vote in Corferias 
(the Corferias votes represent aproximately 15% of the votes in Bogotá for a given year).  
8 Antanas Mockus retired from the mayor’s office in 1997 to present himself as a candidate to the presidency for 
the period 1998-2002 and was replaced by Paul Bromberg.    18
This part of the document takes advantage of the novel characteristic of the panel data to 
present the preferences and patterns of voting of Bogotá citizens according to the economic 
stratum of the neighborhood voting precinct. These statistics are presented in tables 2 and 3 
and in graphs 5 to 11. Two studies have made similar analysis. Gutiérrez (1995) uses similar 
data to that used here (voting per precinct and stratum) but is limited to the period 1992-
1994.  A study conducted by the ‘Institute for the Development of Democracy Luis Carlos 
Galán’ (2001) uses data for the period 1988-1997 but does so at a locality level.  The main 
advantage for using the voting precinct as observation instead of the locality is basically the 
great heterogeneity of the second.  In certain localities, for example, stratum 1 voting 
precincts coexist with stratum 6 voting precincts.  
 
Two different concepts are used to analyze the voting of Bogotá citizens. Preferences 
measure the inclination of the voting precinct towards a party or candidate and are defined 











Where  cit V  are the votes obtained by the candidate (or party) c in the precinct i  in the year 
t . 
 
Preferences show the participation of the candidate c in the votes of one voting precinct but 
this measurement does not provide information on which voting precincts the candidates 
obtain the majority of their votes. Column (2) of table 2 shows that, for all elections, the 
winning candidate received the majority of his votes in middle class areas. This is so 
because 56% of the voting precincts are found in strata 3 and 4 areas. However, among all 
precincts, those that generate the majority of votes on average for the winning candidate are 
located in the highest strata (table 2, column (3)).  
 
To control for these tendencies and in order to see which precincts show a break in their 
voting patterns, the definition of Voting in Excess is used, which is explained below. First, the 
historic potential of voting at a precinct is defined as the rate between the total votes 
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Year Stratum Precincts
% of total 
votes per 
stratum 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 6 1.01 0.17 25.80 27.85 46.35 27.85 67.93
2 69 19.06 0.28 25.92 32.00 42.08 32.00 82.54
3 180 54.40 0.30 25.58 34.32 40.10 34.32 97.72
4 48 15.96 0.33 24.75 39.43 35.82 39.43 112.19
5 12 5.69 0.47 23.66 41.10 35.24 41.10 119.80
6 5 3.52 0.70 24.63 44.32 31.05 44.32 132.20
1 6 1.15 0.19 59.93 26.85 13.22 59.93 88.84
2 69 19.98 0.29 59.67 26.21 14.12 59.67 88.08
3 180 53.39 0.30 65.27 21.72 13.00 65.27 100.75
4 48 15.89 0.33 68.54 23.25 8.21 68.54 105.92
5 12 5.73 0.48 70.81 24.28 4.92 70.81 110.64
6 5 3.49 0.70 70.09 26.73 3.17 70.09 109.94
1 6 1.00 0.17 53.86 16.45 29.69 53.86 71.83
2 69 18.24 0.26 59.77 18.20 22.03 59.77 86.34
3 180 50.99 0.28 62.34 19.81 17.85 62.34 98.80
4 48 18.04 0.38 62.13 26.52 11.35 62.13 115.90
5 12 7.02 0.59 58.07 35.75 6.17 58.07 117.53
6 5 4.34 0.87 51.16 45.23 3.61 51.16 111.54
1 10 2.28 0.23 40.45 4.91 54.64 54.64 68.66
2 77 18.94 0.25 33.19 4.12 62.69 62.69 82.08
3 167 50.54 0.30 26.72 2.75 70.53 70.53 109.91
4 44 16.12 0.37 30.48 2.35 67.18 67.18 112.48
5 15 8.06 0.54 43.83 1.59 54.58 54.58 87.51
6 6 3.67 0.61 54.64 1.67 43.69 43.69 67.62
1 10 2.66 0.27 39.18 58.14 2.68 25.05 48.46
2 77 20.95 0.27 48.37 48.22 3.41 32.70 59.57
3 167 49.33 0.30 62.61 33.04 4.36 49.87 95.28
4 44 14.64 0.33 75.63 19.81 4.57 65.80 125.34
5 15 7.95 0.53 87.04 10.05 2.91 79.57 157.47
6 6 4.10 0.68 90.07 7.86 2.08 83.58 170.43
1 11 3.03 0.28 53.23 6.58 40.19 19.20 45.50
2 75 24.12 0.32 44.72 6.05 49.22 29.00 68.95
3 170 49.71 0.29 34.54 4.08 61.38 45.54 100.06
4 48 14.76 0.31 28.75 2.07 69.18 58.62 121.15
5 11 5.12 0.47 23.13 1.04 75.83 69.86 139.69
6 5 2.91 0.58 21.93 0.75 77.32 72.49 133.89
1 11 3.14 0.29 5.85 0.44 93.71 55.82 133.30
2 75 25.51 0.34 4.50 0.39 95.11 58.82 142.09
3 170 48.39 0.28 3.29 0.39 96.32 51.32 105.83
4 48 14.20 0.30 2.62 0.41 96.96 35.14 65.89
5 11 5.27 0.48 2.08 0.35 97.57 19.20 37.82
6 5 3.12 0.62 1.82 0.57 97.61 14.22 26.78
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Where  cit ϑ  is the participation of the votes generated in the precinct i  for candidate (or 
party)  c in the total of the votes obtained by the candidate (or party) c.  For example, in 
2003, Luis Eduardo Garzón won the Mayor’s Office and the lower strata showed a voting in 
excess of 133% in his favor (Table 2, Column 8).  This figure is calculated as follows: during 
the whole period (1982-2003), the average stratum 1precinct generates 0.25% of the total 
votes in the capital (historic potential); but, in 2003, a precinct with these characteristics 
generated 0.34% of Garzón’s votes. In other words, the average stratum 1 precinct voted 
(33%) over its historic potential in favor of this candidate.   
 
bs . e . bs . e . bs . e . bs . e .
intercept -0.070 0.012 -0.040 0.009 -0.038 0.009 -0.036 0.010
middle class dummy  0.060 0.011 0.035 0.008 0.041 0.008 0.083 0.019
upper class dummy 0.151 0.022 0.082 0.018 0.118 0.017 -0.043 0.009
voting potential 1.062 0.025 1.034 0.020 1.008 0.020 0.951 0.023
R2
N
bs . e . bs . e . bs . e .c l a s s r a n g e
intercept -0.154 0.015 -0.126 0.013 0.159 0.014 lower [0.04, 0.80]
middle class dummy  0.119 0.014 0.276 0.012 -0.131 0.013 middle [0.06, 1.26]
upper class dummy 0.410 0.028 0.113 0.027 -0.430 0.090 upper [0.17, 1.64]





Tabla 3: Voting in Excess per Stratum 














Note:              is the participation of the votes generated at precinct i for candidate c  in the total of votes obtained by  candidate c. 
Column 8 reports the range per stratum of the voting potential.
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Graphs 5 to 11 show the Preferences of Bogotá citizens for each of the winning candidates 
according to the economic stratum of the voting precinct. On the other hand, table 3 shows 
the results for seven regressions (one for each mayor’s election) of the form,   
 
,0 1 2 3 winner it m u i it ddP ϑ αα α α θ =+ + + +   (1) 
 
Where  cit ϑ  (cw i n n e r = in this case) and  i P  have the meanings specified above,  it θ  is the 
term of error and z d , ( ,, zl m u = ), are dummy variables for the lower, middle, and upper 
classes (the variable not included in order to avoid multicollinearity is  l d ).  
 
To interpret model (1) see, for example, column (4) of table 3.  Call the average precinct M 
and any precinct PP. The interpretation of  3 α  is the following: If the historical potential of the 
voting precinct PP is 1% over the historic potential of precinct M, this precinct represents for 
the winner in 1994 (Mockus) 0.951% more votes than precinct M.  This does not mean that 
no voting precinct voted over its historical potential.  In fact, under a certain margin of error, 
all middle class precincts generated for Mockus a percentage of votes greater to that 
























The maximum value of the voting potential for all precincts is 1.64 (Table 3, Column 8). 
Therefore, all middle class precincts voted in excess for Mockus (again, under certain margin 
of error given by  it θ ). 
 
These stylized facts provide evidence in favor of the existence of a vote of opinion for the 
mayors of Bogotá.  In 1994 the middle classes privileged a speech which emphasized on 
legality and civic culture and that anticipated a rise in taxes. In 2003, the lower classes 
supported a leftist speech.  As will be seen later on, there exists evidence that this vote of 
opinion gains strength after the 1991 reforms.   A question that cannot be left aside is that regarding Mockus’s two candidacies. In 1994 Mockus 
represented the preferences of the middle class but in 2000 he represented the preferences of the 
upper class. Apparently, this is due to the fact that Mockus’s first triumph changed the nature of the 
political competition. The following mayor, Enrique Peñalosa, followed in his footsteps and 
presented a program based on civic culture, public space and efficient management.  Additionally, 
in his first candidacy, Mockus defeated two traditional candidates but, six years later, his main 
competitors were all independent. 
 
Maybe the upper classes voted for Mockus in 2000 due to a continuity factor: the proximity 
between Mockus and Peñalosa’s proposals (note the similarity between graphs 9 and 10). In 
addition, maybe the upper classes voted for Mockus because he had the First Mover Advantage: 
the other candidates to the mayor’s office opted to become followers, this being; they presented 
themselves as independents with Mockus-type proposals. The election of Mokcus in 1994 revealed 
that there were new ways of making politics.   
 
B. The Collapse of a Political Machine  
 
“[…] lets offer people land lots so they vote for us and there is no problem and you begin 
to gain power, lets give the people land lots […]”
9 (Gutiérrez, PP.75, 1998. Author’s 
translation).  
 
“Why was the opposition to favors so radical? Imagine a mother facing the dilemma of 
whether or not to give her vote in exchange for the right to education or in exchange for 
access to a plate of food. Seeing yourself obligated to sacrifice one liberty to obtain one 
right is clearly an outrage against citizen dignity.” (Mockus, 2004, PP.8. Author’s 
translation).  
 
The purpose of this section is to present evidence in favor of the argument that reforms reduced 
clientelism effectiveness.  The evidence presented represents this document’s main finding.  
 
If traditional parties were the main users of the machine for the buying of votes they should obtain 
more votes in the areas most exposed to clientelism before the 1991 reforms. But if it is also true 
that the machine was besieged by the reforms, the positive relationship between votes and 
clientelistic exposure should have been broken after the same.  
 
                                                 
9 Evelio is Rafael Forero Fetecua’s assistant, an intermediate patron of the liberal party who mobilizes votes in the 
neighborhoods of “La Meca”, in Bogotá. Evelio proposes this option to Rafael to win votes.  The option was effectively 
used.     24
The empirical strategy consists of finding a measure of exposure to clientelistic linkages and then 
examining the effect of the reforms over the votes obtained by the “machine parties” according to 
the degree of exposure. The measure of exposure chosen is the number of public employees who 
live within the influence area of precinct table i(public employees per one hundred inhabitants).   
 
Several ideas support the choosing of this measure. In the first place, making clientelism is easier 
in places where the government is present.  This is particularly true for modern clientelism where 
the collective patron (the machine) is articulated to the state in order to function (Papadopoulos & 
Vaner, 1989).  
 
In second place, the places with the greatest number of public employees have a high probability 
of having raised market for votes in the past. In fact, employment in the public sector has been 
highlighted as the “common currency of clientelism” (Clapham, 1983; Martz, 1997; Wantchekon, 
2003). For the Colombian case Fernández (2005) shows how, since the 19
th century, burocracy in 
Bogotá employed  the elite. In the second half of the 20
th century, public employment also covered 
intermediaries of modern clientelism. Leal (1989) documents an increase of 220% in the State’s 
payroll between the end of the 70’s and the end of the 80’s. Archer (1990), based on Hartlyn’s 
figures (1988), reports an increase of 246% for the same time and adds that, of these, only 10% 
was governed by civil service rules. Several authors (Archer (1990), Urrutia (1991) and Martz 
(1997)) highlight the importance of these jobs to feed the Colombian political machines.  
 
In the third place, as was mentioned in the literature review, in Colombia intermediaries generally 
build clienteles around their places of residence and relate to the great patrons through jobs in the 
public sector. This justifies the fact that the measure of exposure takes into account the place of 
residence of public employees.  
 
As a first approximation to the problem, the measure of exposure is used (hereinafter referred to as 
“Clientelistic Potential”) to define a control group and a treatment group. The control group is 
constituted by the precincts with a percentage of public employees below the median (alternatively, 
below the 25 percentile) and the treatment group by the precinct with a percentage of public 
employees over the median (alternatively, over the 75 percentile). With these definitions it is 
possible to estimate a regression of differences-in-differences to evaluate the effect of the reforms 
over the votes obtained by the traditional parties in the treated areas (areas with high clientelistic 
potential).  
 
In formal terms, the following regression is estimated,  
 
, 0 1 2 1991 3 1991 traditionals it t t it v b b treatment b d b d treatment ε >> =+⋅ +⋅ +⋅ ⋅ + (2)   25
 
Where  , traditionals it v  are the Preferences for the traditional parties in precinct i, in the year t and  it ε  
is the term of error,  1991 t d >  and treatment  are dummy variables which take a value of one for the 
years after the reforms and for those voting precincts which make up the treatment group, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4 shows the results of model (2) for 1988-1994 (period1) and 1988-2003 (period2). 
Restricting the sample to the first period is preferred, because, as was mentioned above, the 
traditional parties’ loss of legitimacy made them hide their political precedence. In any case, other 










pre-reform 75.1 73.0 2.1 75.1 73.0 2.1
post-reform 58.2 58.1 0.0 50.2 52.5 -2.3
difference -17.0 -14.9 -2.0 -25.0 -20.6 -4.4
pre-reform 75.1 72.4 2.8 75.1 72.3 2.8
post-reform 58.2 58.3 -0.1 50.0 53.7 -3.7
difference -16.9 -14.1 -2.8 -25.1 -18.6 -6.6
Period2: 1988-2003
Table 4: Public Employees as Treatment. The Effect of the Reforms.
Note 1: The information is obtained from a regression of differences-in-differences. See text.
Note 2: The dependent variable is the participation of the votes for the traditional parties in the total of votes of precinct i.   
Pre-reform refers to the elections prior to 1991; post-reform refers to the elections after 1991. In panel I the treatment (control) 
group are the precincts with a clientelistic potential over (under) the median. In panel II the control group are the precincts 
with a clientelistic potential over the 75 percentile; the treatment group are the precincts with a clientelistic potential under the 








The results of model (2) are the following. Prior to the reforms, the precincts in the treatment group 
voted 2.1% more for traditional parties than the control group precincts but after the reforms this 
difference disappears (Table 4, Period1, Panel I). The total effect of the reforms consists in 
eliminating the relative advantage that the traditional parties had in the areas with more public 
employees.  Upon increasing the treatment’s intensity (Table 4, Period1, Panel II), the effect of the 
reforms is even greater (-2.8 vs. -2.0). The machines operated more effectively in the areas with 
more public employees but it was also in the areas more exposed to clientelism where the fracture 
caused by the reforms was the greatest (-2.8<-2.0). 
 
Something similar occurs upon observing the right side of table 4 (Period2). Prior to 1991, 
traditional parties obtained more votes in the treatment group than in the control group. It is also 
true that, as the gap in the degree of exposure between groups widens, a greater pre-reform   26
difference (2.8 vs. 2.1) and a greater total effect (-6.6 vs. -4.4) is observed. However, the 
estimation for the whole period indicates that, in the post-reform period, traditional parties began to 
systematically obtain fewer votes in the areas with the most clientelistic exposure. This may be 
explained because some candidates registered as independent were in fact wolves dressed in 
sheep’s clothing. However, some results that will be presented ahead allow arguing that there is no 
significant post-reform difference in the percentage of votes obtained in the areas exposed and the 
areas not exposed to clientelism.  
 
To control for some unobserved factors and to take into account the effect of the treatment’s 
intensity over the percentage of votes obtained by the traditional parties, the following panel data 
model is estimated,   
, 1991 1991 ' traditionals it t i t i i t i i it v d CP d b CP X d X ρ ηε << =+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + +++ (3) 
 
Where  cit v ,  c traditionals = , are again the Preferences of voting precinct i  in the year t  for 
traditional parties, CP is the measure for clientelistic potential and  X  is a vector of other 
covariates (stratum, education, unemployment, etc.).  t d  are time effects and  i η  are unit (voting 
precinct) effects,   1991 t d <  is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for the period prior to 
the reforms and  it ε is the error term.  
  
The main parameter of interest of model (3) is ρ . An interesting result would be finding  ˆ 0 ρ > . 
This would indicate that the reforms reduced the percentage of votes that traditional parties 
obtained in the precincts with greatest clientelistic potential. It is also expected that  ˆ ˆ b ρ +  be 
positive and that  ˆ b  is statistically equal to zero. If  ˆ ˆ 0 b ρ + > , then it is possible to state that, prior to 
the reforms, there was a positive relation between the clientelistic potential of the voting precincts 
and the percentage of votes obtained by the traditional parties in said precinct.  Additionally, if 
ˆ 0 b = , it is possible to state that, after the reforms, the positive relation between clientelistic 
potential and votes ceases to be true.  
 
Given that from one election to the other there are generalized changes in the preferences for 
traditional parties, model (3) includes categorical variables for each election year ( t d ). In order to 
take into account the effect of other omitted variables, model (3) may be estimated through fixed 
effects or random effects at a voting precinct level. However, the majority of variables at the right 
hand side do not vary over time (see table 1). Therefore there are at least three possibilities. 
Estimate the model through fixed effects and only include the variables interacted with 
1991 t d < (option 1). Estimate (3) with interacted variables and in levels through random effects (option   27
2). Or, lastly, use fixed effects and maintain interacted variables and in levels with a two stage 
procedure as proposed by Plümper and Troeger (2005) (option 3).  
 
Option 2 is chosen for three reasons. In the first place, because when estimating a specification 
such as the proposed in option 1, the Haussman test favors the use of random effects when the 
only regressor included is the clientelistic potential interacted with  1991 t d < .  Secondly, because it is 
intended to make the regressions comparable and have the variables without interaction as a point 
of reference.  In the third place, because the interest of the model is not estimating the magnitude 
of each fixed effect at a voting precinct level. Before continuing, it is necessary to take into account 
that when including controls to the estimations (vector  X ) it is possible that the use of random 
effects ceases to be valid as the controls may be correlated with the term of error. In this sense, 
the main specification is that which only includes the interacted clientelistic potential and in levels, 
with fixed effects for each election year and random effects at a voting precinct level. 
 
The results of model (3) are shown in table 5. The first thing to call attention is that, for any 
specification, in the areas with greater clientelistic potential, the traditional candidates obtained 
more votes prior to the reforms than after the same ( ˆ 0 ρ > ). Columns (1), (2) and (3) estimate the 
model for the complete period (1988-2003), regressions (4), (5) and (6) estimate the model for the 
restricted period (1988-1994). In both cases the regressions by ordinary least squares 
overestimate the value of  ˆ ρ  and underestimate the value of  ˆ b .  This may be explained by the 
generalized fall in votes for the traditional parties after 1991 or by other omitted variables.   
 
 
bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .
t1990 27.60 0.50 27.58 0.48 27.60 0.54 27.58 0.42 27.58 0.42
t1992 28.25 0.88 28.24 0.84 24.86 1.07 24.85 0.83 24.29 1.37
t1994 -20.82 0.88 -20.82 0.84 -24.20 1.07 -24.21 0.83 -24.77 1.37
t1997 41.57 0.88 41.55 0.84
t2000 -14.14 0.88 -14.16 0.84
t2003 -50.53 0.88 -50.54 0.84













bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .bs . e .
t1990 27.58 0.42 27.58 0.39 27.58 0.42 27.58 0.38 9.44 0.46
t1992 25.16 0.83 23.55 1.09 34.29 3.28 34.93 4.88 -13.96 0.91
t1994 -23.89 0.83 -25.51 1.09 -14.77 3.28 -14.18 4.87 -4.27 0.91
CP -4.73 0.69 -2.51 0.78 -0.97 0.60 -5.00 0.98 -0.26 0.66 -2.37 1.70 0.40 1.97
Secondary
University 0.239 0.02 0.26 0.05
Stratum 3.35 0.45 -0.98 0.81
Unemployment -4.39 0.53 -1.08 0.92
t<1991*CP 3.85 0.73 3.06 0.63 2.51 0.60 4.38 0.72 1.44 0.62
t<1991*Second.
t<1991*Univ. -0.09 0.02 -0.16 0.04
t<1991*Stratum -0.87 0.38 2.01 0.73
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Note: CP is clientelistic potential. The columns with the title Mayor (Council) refer to the votes obtained by the traditional candidates to the 
Mayor’s Office (Council).  s.e. is the standard error and b is the estimated parameter. When random effects are included, the estimation method of 

















* Corresponds to an F test under the null hypothesis                   . P-value in brackets. . 





ˆ ˆ 0 b ρ +=
ˆ ˆ 0 b ρ +=
ˆ ˆ 0 b ρ + =
 These problems of omission are taken into account by including random effects at a voting 
precinct level and effects by unit of time. Regression (3), for example, shows that, prior to the 
reforms, the voting precincts with the greatest  clientelistic potential voted in greater measure 
for traditional candidates ( ˆ ˆ 2.41 b ρ += )but that, after the reforms, the opposite occurs 
( ˆ 2.32 b =− ).  
 
Regression (6) of table 5 confirms the results of the differences-in-differences model (Table 
4, Period1). In the post-reform period, there is no significant relation between clientelistic 
potential and votes for the traditional parties. However, prior to the reforms this relation was 
positive and significant ( ˆ 2.02 ρ = ).  In the database, the table with the least clientelistic 
potential is “La Libertad” (!), in the locality of “Bosa” ( 0.15 cp = ) and the table with the 
greatest clientelistic potential is “Altos de San Isidro”, in the locality of “Engativá” ( 4.4 pc = ).  
If all the characteristics of these two precincts are kept constant –except the clientelistic 
potential- regression (6) allows to state that, in the second precinct, traditional candidates to 
the mayor’s office obtained between 6.12% and 11.5% more votes than in the first. In reality, 
in 1988 traditional candidates to the mayor’s office obtained 44.6% of votes of “La Libertad” 
and 71.6% of votes of “Altos de San Isidro”. In 1990 the figure is 83% and 90%, in the same 
order.  
 
Prior to the reforms, the areas with the greatest clientelistic potential supported the traditional 
candidates to the Mayor’s Office.  But as is shown by column (12) of table 5, the same is true 
for the candidates to the Council. This result tempers the affirmation according to which, 
today in Bogotá, there coexists dirty politics or of plebeians–that of the Council which would 
continue to use clientelistic linkages- and clean politics or of the elite –that of the Mayor’s 
Office which would have generated programmatic linkages- (Hernández, 2004, 
Otálora.2002). In terms of effectiveness, if it is true that the break was greater for candidates 
to the Mayor’s Office, clientelism lost effectiveness as a mechanism to capture votes both for 
candidates to the Council and for candidates to the Mayor’s Office.   
 
The main difference between columns (3) and (6) of table 5 has to do with the effect of 
clientelistic potential for the post-reform period. The first regression predicts a ‘Rebound’ 
effect (see also: table 4, period2): after the reforms the areas with greatest clientelistic 
potential vote less for traditional parties; but the second predicts the break of any relationship 
between clientelistic potential and votes. Columns (13) and (14) favor the last statement   30
through a falsification exercise by regressing the votes obtained by traditional parties against 
the clientelistic potential for each period (broad and restricted sample, respectively) but using 
post-reform data only. After 91, the percentage of public jobs around the voting precinct has 
no relation with the percentage of votes obtained by the traditional parties in said precinct. By 
construction, the same is true for independent candidates to the Mayor’s Office.  
 
Literature on clientelism has made emphasis on the determinants of clientelistic linkages. A 
great part of the studies coincide in that clientelism is “Isomorphic to underdevelopment” 
(Medina and Stokes, 2006).  For Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2006), this is explained because 
people with little education have greater difficulty in calculating costs and benefits and 
therefore cannot estimate the long-term benefit of programmatic policies.  For Lyne (2006), it 
is an opportunity cost problem: the reserve price to give up a vote is less for poorer people. 
Other studies (Auyero, 2000; Brusco et al., 2002), show that clientelism is correlated with 
high rates of unemployment. This may be explained because, at higher levels of 
unemployment, the patrons’ offers (and the expectation of a job in the public sector) become 
more attractive.  In Brusco et al. (2002), for example, 45% of 1920 people interviewed in 
Argentina, assured approaching the party if the head of household lost his job.    
 
The data allows confirming some of the hypotheses proposed in the previous paragraph. 
This is true so long it is admitted that the exogenous change caused by the reforms of 1991 
limited clientelistict practices. If in addition to the clientelistic potential, the percentage of 
people over 30 with university education (or secondary), the stratum or the unemployment 
rate is separately included, the expected sign is obtained for each of these variables. Prior to 
the reforms, traditional parties that presumably were involved in vote buying, obtained less 
votes in the areas with more education (Table 5, columns 7 and 8) and with a greater level of 
wealth (Table 5, column 9) and more votes in the areas with more unemployment (Table 5, 
column 10).  However, when all the regressors are included at the same time (Table 5, 
column 11), this last variable ceases to be significant and it may be concluded that traditional 
parties obtained less votes in places with a greater level of education and more votes in the 
wealthier areas. Probably, both the stratum and unemployment were previously capturing the 
effect of education (at a higher stratum, more education and with more education, lower rates 
of unemployment). Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2006) hypothesis on the easiness of doing 
clientelism in the least educated areas finds empirical support in Bogotá.  
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The relation between votes obtained by traditional parties and clientelist potential seems to 
go against the theory which argues that clientelism is a phenomenon linked to 
underdevelopment or, more specifically, to poverty.  Public employees generally are middle 
class white collars. However, this is not idiosyncratic to the Colombian case. Lyne (2006) 
remembers that in Brazil of the mid-20
th century the government agencies had to register 
their employees in bloc to go voting.  Similarly, in Palermo, Southern Italy, a great part of 
clients were also white-collar employees who entered the state’s payroll thanks to 
recommendation letters from influential patrons
10 (Chubb, 1981).  For Mexico, Magaloni et al. 
(2006) show that clientelism is more prevalent at intermediate levels of development. For the 
Colombian case, Leal (1989) states that “The greater part of burocracy with clientelistic taste 
comes from the new middle classes that emerged with the capitalist organization.”(PP. 8. 
Author’ translation). 
 
The reader who has carefully observed table (5) will note that when additional controls are 
included it is not possible to affirm that  ˆ ˆ b ρ +  is different than zero. Although it was 
mentioned above that the specification with additional controls may be problematic it is 
important to point out what the implication of this result are. Does this destroy the hypothesis 
on the loss of effectiveness of clientelism? Probably not. Diaz-Cayeros et. al (2006) develop 
a model in which candidates reduce their risk by diversifying their offers. In certain areas, 
candidates offer programmatic policies but in others they lean on discretionary (clientelistic) 
transfers. If it is true that  ˆ ˆ 0 b ρ += and  ˆ 0 ρ >  as is the case for columns (7), (8), (9) and 
(11), then, in the period prior to the reforms, the traditional parties did not obtain a greater (or 
lesser) percentage of votes in the areas with more public employees. Possibly the 
candidates diversified their offers and therefore obtained a similar percentage of votes in the 
areas where they followed programmatic policies and where they followed clientelistic 
policies. However, the interesting thing in this case is that there is a structural break after 
1991: with a greater clientelistic potential in the voting precinct, the fall in the percentage of 
votes obtained by traditional parties is greater. This would indicate that, in these areas, 
traditional parties faced difficulties to change clientelistic practices for programmatic 
practices. Maybe traditional candidates broke promises in the areas where clientelism was 
carried out or maybe they had little credibility with regards to independent candidates. 
Wantchekon (2003), for example, shows that, in Benín, incumbent candidates have greater 
                                                 
10 The weight of the recommendation letter –which used to be delivered prior to the elections-, depended on the 
influence of the patron, which in turn depended on the votes he obtained at the ballot box. This is an additional 
way of tying the expected utility of the voter to the patron’s luck.    32
credibility when offering clientelistic transfers than the opposition candidates. However, when 
offering public goods, the opposition has a relative advantage as they can highlight the 
revealed lack of capability of the incumbents to supply public goods. Although these 
hypotheses may be valid, the results of columns (7), (8), (9) and (11) are considered with 
skepticism.  
                                 
D. Social Services, Votes for the Traditional Parties and Clientelism 
 
“-Send me the bill- he said. 
-¿To you or to the municipality? 
The mayor didn’t look at him. He closed the door and said, through the metallic net. 
-It’s the same thing.” 
(Gabriel García Márquez, “Un Día de Estos”. Author’s Tranlation). 
 
Urrutia (PP. 380, 1991) mentions that one of the main government services used to do 
clientelism are social services (electricity, water and telephone).  Eslava (2006) and Eslava 
and Drazen (2005) find that in Colombia, prior to the elections, the proportion of expenditure 
assigned to infrastructure goods such as electricity, water and communications increases. As 
well as Lizzeri and Perisco (2001), these authors highlight the importance of the selective 
character of these types of goods but also highlight their visibility.  
 
Lulle (2004) argues that, in Bogotá, the Communal Action Boards  -civil organizations at a 
neighborhood level- take advantage of the visibility of this investment in infrastructure to 
obtain political support. These organizations, which have been reiteratively catalogued as 
vote buyers (Otálora, 2002; García; Gutiérrez, 1998), channeled the citizen’s demands for 
social services in exchange for votes.  
 
This part of the document investigates the effect of clientelistic practices on public services 
coverage at a neighborhood level (around the voting precinct) and at a locality level. It would 
be ideal to have investment variables in hand to compare them to the result variables (the 
coverage). However, it was not possible to obtain the former for the period under study.  
 
The social services coverage variables were obtained for 1993 at a censual sector level 
(sample 1) and for 1985, 1993 ad 2003 at a locality level (sample 2) (table 1).  Note that one 
of the coverage measures corresponds to the year 1993.  This measure is assigned to the   33
year 1991, meaning, to the period prior to the reforms.  This is not problematic as Castro, the 
first mayor elected after 1991, takes office in 1992 and a year is not considered enough time 
to change the distribution of the capital’s social services coverage.  
 
The exercises to be carried out are the following. First we take advantage of the number of 
observations in sample 1 to determine if the areas that voted in greater measure for 
traditional parties in 1988 and 1990 had greater coverage of social services prior to the 
reforms.  Then, sample 2 is used to observe the changes in the political determinants of 
social services coverage through time, before and after the reforms.   
 
For the period prior to the reforms, the following model is estimated,  
 
  , it traditionals i it vu ς αδ = ++  (4) 
 
Where  it ς  is the coverage of social services (sewage, aqueduct, telephone, electricity or the 
sum of all four) around the precinct i , α  is the intercept,  it u  is the term of error and 
, traditionals i v  is the percentage of votes obtained by the traditional candidates in 1988 and 1990 
in the voting precinct i .  
 
The parameter of interest is δ  but to adequately estimate it,  , traditionals i v  should be exogenous.  
As it is probable that this is not true the votes obtained by the traditional parties are 
instrumented through the following regression,  
 
, traditionals i i it vC P γ φω = ++  (5)  
 
Where CP is the measure of clientelist potential that has been used, γ  is the intercept and 
it ω  is the term of error that must cleanse the unwanted variation in  , traditionals i v .  CP is 
considered a good instrument because the majority of public employees around the precinct 
i was already there in 1988. In fact, by the mid 80’s the growth in public employment had 
already reached its limits (Martz, 1997). For this reason, it is not expected that the jobs 
provided by the traditional parties in 1988 and 1990 will considerably affect the percentage of 
public employees around the voting precinct.    34
Table 6 resumes the results of this model. Panel A shows the estimation using instrumental 
variables. It had been previously exposed that traditional candidates received more votes in 
the precincts with greater clientelistic potential before 1991.  This is confirmed in Panel A, 
Column 1. Upon using this relation as an instrument we find that the areas that in 1988 and 
1990 voted more for these candidates obtained a greater coverage of social services 
(column 2).  
 
This is true for sewage, electricity and telephone coverage (Panel I, Columns 4, 5 and 6) but 
is not true for aqueduct coverage (Panel I, Column 3).  For the first three the effect is 
significant and its magnitude is considerable; the estimation of instrumental variables 
indicates that in an area with 1000 households, for example, an increase of 1% in the votes 
in favor of the traditional candidates implied 14 more houses with electricity and 32 more 
houses with sewage.   
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 b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.  b s.e.
intercept 71.36 0.75
5.4 0.5 0.74 0.13 3.22 0.3 1.43 0.12 5.63 0.58
CP 2.16 0.63
F Relevance*
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.  b s.e.
intercept 260.5 9.41 96.55 2.23 77.54 5.73 86.38 2.395 41.58 10.55
0.31 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.112 0.027 0.5 0.11
T Weak Exogeneity**
R2
 b s.e.  b s.e.  b s.e.  b s.e.  b s.e.
Intercept 273.6 1.45 96.69 0.38 84.48 0.88 92.42 0.40 70.42 1.69
CP 11.64 1.07 1.60 0.28 6.95 0.66 3.09 0.27 12.14 1.25
R2
N













Nota: Variables are in level. CP is clientelistic potential defined as the number of public employees per 100 inhabitants. SS is the sum of  
the aqueduct, sewage, electricity and telephone coverages.                         is the percentage of votes in precinct i obtained by the 
traditional candidates in 1988 and 1990.
(5)
[0.07]





Table 6: Votes for the Traditional Parties and Coverage of Social Services: 1988-1990
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Panel C: Reduced Form 
Panel A:Instrumental Variables

















The estimators by ordinary least squares (Table 6, Panel B) are also significant but have a 
smaller magnitude. This attenuation bias may have its origin in the reverse causality.  Maybe 
the areas with less coverage are more prone to developing clientelistic ties and vote more for 
traditional candidates that generate expectations of a better quality of life (more coverage)
11.  
This is consistent with the theory that relates underdevelopment and clientelism. Another 
possibility is that, in the OLS estimations, the votes for traditional parties are capturing the 
                                                 
11 However, it is also possible that the areas with more coverage are more prone to clientelism because of the 
past tradition of political machines providing more coverage.   36
level of education of the population or the rate of unemployment which would also reduce the 
magnitude of the estimator given that, as it has been seen, prior to the reforms, the areas 
with greater unemployment voted more and the areas with greater levels of education voted 
less for the traditional parties. 
 
Panel C of table 6 estimates the reduced version of the model.  The estimation is useful 
given that it is most probable that the traditional parties have compensated their main 
followers with jobs in the public sector.  This is not problematic if, as was mentioned before, 
the majority of public employees around table i was already there before 1988.  But if this is 
not fulfilled, the reduced version of the model has the advantage of not replicating problems 
of reverse causality (it is not evident to think in an effect that goes from coverage to the 
number of public employees). 
 
In the majority of cases (Table 6, Panel A, B and C) the sign of δ  is as expected and is 
significant. This is evidence that, prior to the reforms, a greater percentage of votes for the 
traditional parties implied a greater coverage of public services. But if this is true, and if 
clientelism was reduced after 1991, it should also be true that there is no relation between 
clientelist potential and the coverage of public services after the reforms.  In fact, when 
politicians were part of the management boards of social services companies, it was in their 
interest to undersupply social services.  With supply being less than demand, politicians were 
able to offer social services to obtain votes.  However, after 1994, programmatic mayors 
privatized social services companies and turned them into profit maximizing firms that 
increased coverage and crowded out clientelism.  
  
A first fact that allows maintaining that social services provision was separated from electoral 
results has to do with the increase in coverage experimented by Bogotá in the 90’s. The 
capital is recognized worldwide for its progress in this area. Today access to social services 
is almost total.  This fact, together with that found in the previous section, points towards a 
break in the relation between electoral results and coverage. Even so the variance that still 
exists at the level of the locality (sample 2) was used to estimate the following model,  
 
11 9 9 1 2 jt t jt t jt jt dC P d C P w ςφ φ <= =+⋅ ⋅ +⋅ +  (6) 
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Where ς  is the coverage in locality j , at time t ,  t d  are the fixed effects per unit of time, CP 
is the measure of clientelistic potential and w is the term of error. This model is comparable 
to the reduced form model of table 6 (Panel C). Note that an instrumental variables 
regression is not chosen due to the number of observations in sample 2. 
 
Table E shows that  1 φ  is positive and significant and that  2 φ  is close to zero and non-
significant. Even at the locality level, the places with greatest clientelistic potential have 
greater coverage of public services prior to the reforms. However, as occurs with the relation 
between clientelistic potential and the votes for traditional parties, this relation breaks after 
the reforms. 
 
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept  242.63 6.67 81.21 2.45 75.21 3.11 86.21 1.51
t1991 20.37 3.52 10.42 1.29 3.69 1.64 6.26 0.80
t2003 54.65 9.49 17.52 3.49 22.81 4.43 13.31 2.15
t<=1991*CP 17.80 5.69 4.98 2.09 9.92 2.65 2.89 1.29
CP 0.74 2.20 0.25 0.81 0.39 1.03 0.10 0.50
R2
N
Table 7: Clientelistic Potential and Social Services Coverage 1988-2003
Notes: SS is the sum of the aqueduct, sewage and electricity coverages. CP is the locality’s 
Clientelistic Potential (public employees per one hundred inhabitants). When locality fixed effects are 











V. Conclusion  
 
This document focuses on a political change to explain the changes experienced by Bogotá 
in the early 90’s. It is argued that the political change caused the weakening of clientelism 
and the collapse of a political machine, which integrated big patrons on one side and voters 
on the other.  
 
The main conclusion of the document is that in Bogotá, the areas most exposed to 
clientelism used to vote for traditional parties and received, in exchange, greater access to   38
social services. The 1991 reforms – which limited the discretionary resources in the hands of 
politicians, promoted competition between parties and introduced a secret electoral ballot – 
ended the effectiveness of clientelism and installed firewalls between electoral results and 
the provision of public goods and social services.  
 
One corner of this document provides empirical evidence on the relation between  the 
decrease in clientelism and the provision of local public goods or club type goods (electricity, 
aqueduct, sewage). However, the document is supported on theoretical premises to deduce 
the effect over the provision of global public goods (security, education, health). An 
interesting exercise could be to empirically prove the theoretical postulation that models the 
provision of this type of goods as a negative function of clientelism. It would also be 
interesting to compare the case for Bogotá with other urban areas in the country. Maybe this 
would allow unraveling the relative importance of institutional and idiosyncratic factors, which 
broke down the machine.  
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Candidate Party % Votes Candidate Party % Votes Candidate Party % Votes
Winner Pastrana Conservador 35.45 Caicedo Liberal 65.67 Castro Liberal 61.34
Second Place Caicedo Liberal 25.52 Vallejo Conservador 23.01 Jaramillo Conservador 21.29
Third Place   Ossa Liberal 23.17 Pizarro M-19 7.68 Lucio M-19 5.45
Candidate Party % Votes Candidate Party % Votes Candidate Party % Votes
Winner Mockus Indep. 66.26 Peñalosa Liberal 52.53 Mockus Visionario 45.75
Second Place Peñalosa Liberal 31.01 Moreno Conservador 31.14 Castellanos Cristiano 11.02
Third Place   Moreno Conservador 2.73 Galán Liberal 0.50 Páez P. comunit. 0.09
Candidate Party % Votes
Winner Garzón Polo Dem.  47.58
Second Place Lozano Col. Siempre 42.57
Third Place   Mejía Firmes Bta. 2.83
Note: The table shows the percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate, the second place candidate and the third place candidate in the precincts of 
the panel. The candidates in italics are the candidates who appear in the books of the "National Civil Status Registry" as independent (Not Conservative, nor 
Liberal). The rest are traditional candidates. Peñalosa registered as liberal but campained as an independent. 
2003
1992
2000
1988 1990
1994 1997
 